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How	anti-Muslim	disinformation	campaigns	in	India
have	surged	during	COVID-19
Shakuntala	Banaji	and	Ram	Bhat	(LSE)	explain	why	hate	and	disinformation	campaigns	against	Muslims	in	India
have	increased	during	the	COVID-19	pandemic.
Some	commentators	naively	assumed	that	a	life-threatening	pandemic	would	bring	citizens	together,	and	be
enough	to	suspend	if	not	completely	stop	the	now	endemic	barrage	of	disinformation	targeted	at	Indian	Muslims.
However,	COVID-19	has	simply	added	a	new	dimension	to	the	hate	speech	and	disinformation	circulated	about
Muslim	communities	in	India.
The	BJP,	RSS	and	Sangh	Parivar	campaign	of	producing	hate	and	inciting	violence	against	Muslims	in	India	runs
as	a	well-oiled	machine	that	has	internal	complexity	and	leaves	the	ruling	party	with	plenty	of	scope	for	plausible
deniability	when	their	supporters	resort	to	murder.	The	steps	in	this	manufacture	and	circulation	of	violent
disinformation	often	involve	both	mainstream	and	social	media.	Notorious	journalists	and	anchors	known	to	support
the	BJP	government	and	the	Hindutva	cause	raise	apparently	legitimate	doubts:	in	this	case,	the	faux	troubling
questions	centred	around	the	“intentions”	of	a	Muslim	gathering	in	Delhi,	the	Tablighi	Jamaat	held	prior	to	the
announcement	of	lockdown,	even	when	there	was	never	any	basis	to	such	reports.
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At	the	same	time,	dispersed	IT-cells	and	supporters	of	Hindutva	groups	and	the	ruling	party	on	WhatsApp	and	other
social	media	flood	their	various	groups	and	online	spaces	with	a	parallel	set	of	misinformation	and	disinformation-
laden	memes,	questions,	images,	GIFs	and	speeches	from	politicians.	This	further	casts	aspersions	on	individual
Muslims	and	suspicion	on	the	Muslim	community’s	loyalty	as	citizens	and	human	beings,	accusing	them	of	being
COVID	“super-spreaders”,	and	implicating	them	in	a	supposedly	dastardly	plot	to	infect	Hindus	by	spitting	on	food,
and	infiltrating	respectable	middle	class	spaces	through	their	jobs	as	salespeople,	cooks,	chauffeurs	or	watchmen.
In	March	2020,	within	days,	such	networks	of	disinformation	had	led	to	entrenched	rumours	that	Muslims	were
‘intentionally’	infecting	Hindus	through	a	range	of	behaviours.	As	a	result,	several	spaces	–	residential	settlements
and	hospitals	for	instance	–	illegally	and	unconstitutionally	denied	entry	and	service	to	some	Muslims,	resulting	in
further	unnecessary	deaths.	In	a	parallel	move,	and	implicitly	supporting	the	BJP	MLAs	and	supporters	who	were
pushing	the	initial	disinformation,	the	government	of	India	banned	2,550	individuals	from	entering	India	for	a	period
of	ten	years	–	all	of	them	foreign	Tablighi	Jamaat	followers.
The	naïve	notion	that	reporting	or	uncovering	the	‘truth’	and	the	‘facts’	will	mitigate	violence	and
undermine	prejudice	needs	to	be	banished.
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Meanwhile	a	more	public	and	systemic	disinformation	campaign	emanates	from	mainstream	institutions.	For
instance,	a	civil	society	institution	composed	of	ex-judges	with	ties	to	diaspora	Hindutva	groups,	recently	submitted
a	report	that	claimed	to	identify	the	instigators	of	the	Delhi	pogrom	that	took	place	in	February	2020	and	left	39
Muslims	dead	at	the	hands	of	Hindu	far	right	mobs.	This	“report”,	which	consists	almost	entirely	of	ideological
fabrications,	recasts	Muslim	dissidents	protesting	against	discriminatory	citizenship	laws	as	‘urban	naxals’	and	‘anti-
nationals’.	Even	before	such	accusations	had	been	made	public,	the	Home	Ministry	had	used	the	disarray	caused
by	the	pandemic	as	an	opportunity	to	imprison	Muslim	democracy	activists,	and	to	take	even	moderately	critical
journalists	from	Kashmir	and	elsewhere	into	custody	or	slap	them	with	false	charges.	So,	why	does	all	of	this	clearly
authoritarian	and	anti-democratic	misrepresentation	and	action	against	mainly	Muslim	citizens	continue	with
virtually	no	protest	from	a	majority	of	the	Indian	public?	There	are	several	reasons.
First,	the	naïve	notion	that	reporting	or	uncovering	the	‘truth’	and	the	‘facts’	will	mitigate	violence	and	undermine
prejudice	needs	to	be	banished.	Our	research	into	hate	speech	and	misinformation	on	WhatsApp	suggests	that
upper	and	middle	caste	Hindu	social	media	groups	with	an	investment	in	the	ideology	of	Hindu	supremacy
knowingly	produce	and	share	disinformation	targeted	against	Muslims.
Second,	less	ideologically	and	politically	embedded	individuals	within	these	groups	share	disinformation	under	the
guise	of	more	positive	citizenship	imaginaries:	civic	duty,	protecting	one’s	religion	or	one’s	community,	national
security,	promoting	good	health	and	hygiene,	promoting	national	unity	and	so	on	or	do	so	to	retain	their	position	as
key	informants	to	the	group	without	thought	to	the	damage	of	sharing	false	information.	Such	deep-seated
imaginaries	disavow	the	violence	perpetrated	by	the	very	people	passing	on	the	disinformation,	project	that
violence	onto	the	targeted	communities,	and	legitimise	anti-Muslim	discrimination	across	India	and	the	diaspora.
Rather	than	only	countering	disinformation	with	empirical	facts	or	presenting	the	dangers	of	spreading	hate	amidst
a	pandemic,	it	is	imperative	for	anti-racists,	researchers	and	ethical	journalists	to	look	at	the	political	history	of
Indian	disinformation	and	to	ask	whose	political	interests	are	served	by	the	sophisticated	and	systematic	sharing	of
mediated	and	community-transmitted	disinformation	against	Indian	Muslims?
In	India	(and	the	diaspora),	Hindu	society	is	currently	and	has	historically	been	controlled	by	a	select	few
organisations	and	dominant	caste	individuals.	The	process	of	maintaining	control	through	hegemony	is	required
since	a	minority	cannot	control	a	majority	by	force	alone.	Muslims,	as	one	of	the	largest	distinct	non-Hindu	social
groups	in	India,	have	consistently	been	cast	as	the	“threatening	other”	by	Hindu-chauvinist	politics,	literature	and
media.	The	Muslim	as	an	enemy	outsider	has	come	to	constitute	the	tie	that	binds	disparate	groups	with	competing
social	interests	together	into	a	mythical	Hindu-ness.	In	the	early	years	of	the	20th	century,	such	a	production	of
Hinduism	(via	the	Muslim)	was	transparent	in	the	writings	of	early	Hindutva	functionaries	and	leaders.
Over	the	last	four	decades,	incremental	social	reforms	and	uneven	capitalist	development	has	necessitated	a	more
sophisticated	approach	to	building	the	idea	of	a	Hindu	nation.	The	old	broadcasting	technologies	of	writing,	radio
and	television	are	inadequate	to	account	for	proliferation	of	identities.	In	many	states	of	India,	intermediary	caste
groups	have	become	extremely	influential	–	Lingayats	and	Vokkaligas	in	Karnataka,	Kammas	and	Reddys	in
Andhra	Pradesh,	Marathas	in	Maharashtra,	Jats	in	Haryana	and	so	on.	Social	media	platforms	and	applications
powered	by	global	digital	networks	have	begun	to	be	put	to	use	in	significant	ways	for	political	goals	in
contemporary	societies.	The	basic	architecture	of	othering	Muslims	to	constitute	Hinduness	and	Hindu	nationalism
remains	a	historical	fact.	The	affordances	of	platforms	and	devices,	as	well	as	new	possibilities	of	differentiated
mass	distribution,	present	enormous	potential	to	produce	the	idea	of	India	as	a	Hindu	nation	with	an	internal	enemy
community	in	new	ways.	The	fabricated	association	of	Muslims	with	the	spread	of	Covid-19	is	a	prime	example.
Whose	political	interests	are	served	by	the	sophisticated	and	systematic	sharing	of	disinformation
against	Indian	Muslims?
In	different	locations,	depending	on	the	class	and	caste	composition	in	a	given	society,	the	same	vicious	anti-
Muslim	imaginaries	are	incubated	either	as	a	health	and	hygiene	problem,	a	religious	provocation,	a	national
security	threat	or	danger	to	other	communities	through	extreme	fecundity	and	population	growth.	Disinformation
distribution	networks	are	built	like	inverse	pyramids	where	local	actors	(often	younger	males	with	some	basic
computer	skills	looking	for	entrepreneurial	opportunities)	receive	money	from	shadowy	firms	or	NGOs	(with	very
loose	and	hard	to	trace	links	to	the	BJP	party),	are	able	to	inflect	broad	imaginaries	with	local	contexts.	Other
groups	engage	in	disinformation	not	only	for	money	but	also	as	a	way	to	get	noticed	as	a	rising	political	personality.
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This	design	ensures	that	anti-Muslim	disinformation	is	tremendously	flexible,	local	and	persuasive	to	those	who	are
already	looking	for	confirmation	of	their	hatred	and	deep-seated	prejudice.	Mirroring	white	rightwing	Islamophobia,
common	features	of	disinformation	in	India	today	include	the	use	of	extreme	emotions	and	images.	Disinformation
frequently	hinges	on	the	use	of	shocking	images	that	seek	to	elicit	a	strong	emotion	in	the	user,	compelling	him	or
her	to	share	it	with	others.	The	active	attachment	of	the	idea	of	sharing	of	information	against	the	Muslim	other	–	as
a	form	of	civic	duty	and	national	security	–	further	enhances	the	likelihood	of	misinformation’s	journey	from	a
systemic	propaganda	towards	less	ideologically	embedded	sections	of	a	community.
Another	tactic	used	is	the	embedding	of	disinformation	in	a	constant	flow	of	banal	messaging	from	“trusted	elders”
or	“community	leaders”,	which	ensures	that	users	are	habituated	both	to	receiving	and	to	sharing	content	without
much	intellectual	pause	or	critique.	Receiving	and	forwarding	messages	in	a	particular	group	or	across	groups	is	a
mark	of	sociality	and	acceptance	in	those	groups.	In	fact,	belonging	to	a	group	without	being	seen	to	share	comes
to	be	seen	and	understood	as	suspicious:	a	performance	of	(Hindu/caste)	group	loyalty	is	thus	a	facet	in	the	spread
of	malevolent	misinformation	and	disinformation.
Given	that	discrimination,	violence	and	disinformation	against	Muslims	is	an	extensive	historical	and	political
problem	in	India	and	the	diaspora	just	as	violence	and	misinformation	against	social	groups	such	as	Ahmadis,
Christians	and	Hindus	is	a	problem	in	neighbouring	Pakistan,	strategies	for	countering	it	need	both	short	and	long-
term	solutions.	Short-term	solutions	involve	a	far	stronger	commitment	from	mainstream	media	organisations,
governments	and	social	media	companies	on	ideas	about	civil	and	human	rights	and	the	right	to	life	rather	than	the
current	and	narrow	emphasis	on	free	speech	as	defined	by	those	in	powerful	positions,	as	well	as	a	recognition	of
the	multiple	forms	taken	by	Islamophobic	rhetoric.	Long-term	solutions	include	the	building	of	a	culture	of	anti-
racism,	historical	awareness	and	critical	media	literacy	from	childhood	upwards,	involving	widespread	open
discussions	about	linkages	between	technologies	of	representation	and	political	power,	as	well	as	pointing	towards
the	benefits	for	all	of	a	society	with	less	violence	and	more	equity	and	solidarity.
This	post	was	originally	published	on	the	Students	Against	Hindutva	Ideology	blog,	then	MediaLSE,	and	is	reposted
with	thanks.	It	represents	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	the	position	of	LSE	blogs,	nor	LSE.
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